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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
' ' '

—•—

1

The Defendant—Appellant appeals fro|m the judgment
upon a jury verdict in a criminal action brought against him
by the State of Utah for an alleged violation of 76-6-302
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, to-wit:

aggravated

robbery.
D I S P O S I T I O N IN LOWER COURT?
....

i.

.

i

•

ii

The Defendant—Appellant was found gulilty by a jury
and the Defendant was sentenced by the Court.

The Defendant's

challenges for cause and motion for a directed verdict v/ere
denied by the Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant—Appellant respectfully prays that the
verdict be set aside and a verdict of not guillty entered or
that a new trial be ordered.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant—Appellant, Keith S. Brooks, hereinafter
referred to as the Defendant, was tried before the Honorable
Thornley K. Swan, District Court Judge for the Second Judicial District for Davis County, State of Utah, on the 25th
day of November, 1975.

The defendant was charged with the

offense of aggravated robbery as set forth in 76-6-302, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
There were present in the Court 21 potential jurors
of which 16 were called and seated.

(Court Record, page 20)

The 16 potential jury members were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Mason Moore
Glen C. Lewis
Dan Lee
Lawrence Byington
R. F. Zeigler
Carol Elder
Steven R. Chapman
Pam Ward
Marshall E. Maxfield
Jean Isler
Frank Zamora
James Mayfield
Phil G. Greenwood
Dorothy T. Bodily
Thomas Creamer

16.

Dee Wayne Downs

The Court began the questioning of the prospective
jurors with the following results from the prospective juror,
Mason Moore.
Do any of you know Barry Godwin?
Mr. Moore?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MASON MOORE: He f s a neighbor,
personal friend. I know his family.

-2-

THE COURT: And by "a neighbor" how close
a neighbor? Next door or down the street?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE:

Dowh the street.

THE COURT: Do you have a clo$e neighbor relationship with him, or would you sa^ a casual neighbor
relationship? By "close" I would ask if he visits
in your home and you visit in his home?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: Very infrequently,
although we do meet in church activities occasionally.
THE COURT:

Member of the same ward?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any ecclesiastical
authority over him or he over you?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE:

None, whatsoever.

THE COURT: So in that respect its a casual,
more or less, relationship in the watrd. Would that
be correct?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: Yes.
(Partial Transcript, Page 2, Line 6, througlta. Page 3, Line 2;
Transcript begins at page 57 of Court Record)
MR. ECHARD: I'd like to have Mir. Moore asked
if his, just the general relationship with Mr. Godwin would affect him in trying the cajse at all,
under any circumstances; if he feels he can be a
fair and impartial jury member knowing that he may
be one of the key witnesses involved in the trial.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: It might - I might
have some feelings, since I know Barry, that I'd
like to see him receive whatever is due, or that
justice was met. But I think the facts would have
to answer that, and I would address myself to the
facts.
MR. ECHARD: I wonder if we could ask Mr.
Moore, Your Honor, if he were sitting as a defendant
in a trial, and a witness that was testifying in
that trial against him had a friend sitting on the
jury with the same state of mind that Mr. Moore has,
if he, as a defendant, would feel comfprtable about
that.
-3-

PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE:

Probably not, b u t —

MR* ECHARD: I would ask that Mr. Moore be
excused, Your Honor.
(P.T., P. 4, L. 22 through P. 5, L. 15)
MR. ECHARD: Thank you, Your Honor, I have no
further questions. I would, for the record, challenge
Mr. Moore and Mrs. Ward, because of their close relationship with a witness.
(P.T., P. 7, L. 1 through L. 4)
THE COURT: The jury system, ladies and gentlemen, was invested in an atmosphere and a situation
so that parties could be tried by a jury of their
peers. And in most communities the parties are
known to the jurors and the jurors know something
about the parties. I think it would be almost impossible, in some of our rural counties, to choose
a jury who did not know witnesses and did not know
the parties or something about the parties. Those
acquaintanceships do not disqualify a person to serve
as a juror in a case. Those relationships could,
however, result in disqualification. But that would
be if, because of those relationships, a juror would
have difficulty setting those relationships aside and
trying the facts of the case squarely on their merits
and making a decision without bias or prejudice.
Mr. Moore, do you feel that you can do that in
this case?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Mrs. Ward, do you feel that you can?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is there any juror who feels that
he cannot do this?
No hands are raised.
The challenges are denied.
MR. ECHARD: I believe Mr. Moore had a question,
Your Honor, for the Court.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: The question I have
is, you mentioned facts. And, of course, there's
other than facts that enter into trials, and it
would be difficult to say definitely if there were
something that was in balance.
-4-

THE COURT:

On the other hand, you are the sole triers of
the facts, and that is your sole duty, to listen to
the evidence and to determine what the facts are and
to apply the law as the Court states it to you*
Do you think you would have any difficulty in
that regard, Mr. Moore?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE:
for your clarification.
THE COURT:

And I thank you

Mrs. Ward?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:
THE COURT:

No.

No.

Any other juror?

No response.
THE COURT:

Do you pass the jurors for cause.

MR. GUNNARSON:
THE COURT:
MR. ECHARD:

We so do, Your j^onor.

And except as noted, do you?
Yes, Your Honor, except as noted.

THE COURT: The Court will find that the jurors
are qualified to serve in this case, and counsel may
take their exceptions, or their challenges.
(P.T., P. 7, L. 19, through P. 10, L. 17)
The following questions were put to the prospective
juror, Pam Ward:
Do any of you know Steve Leishmah, who has been
in uniform?
Mrs. Ward?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR PAM WARD:

Yes.,

THE COURT: What is the nature of your acquaintanceship with Mr. Leishman?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: He' s a very good friend
of mine and my husband's. I work with his wife at
the bank, -and my husbandfs known him for quite a few
years.
THE COURT: By "very good friend," do you visit
in each other's homes?
-5-

PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Frequently or occasionally?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:

Occasionally.

THE COURT: Do you have any relationship other
than the friendship and your business relationship?
You say Mrs. Leishman works at the bank?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:
THE COURT:

Yes.

With you, regular?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:

Yes.

THE COURT: And so you have a regular business
relationship with her?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:

Uh huh.

Yes.

THE COURT: And your husbands are friendly,
and you get together from time to time?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

Anyone else know Mr. Leishman?

No other hands are raised.
(P.T., P. 3, L. 8, through P. 4, L. 10)
I'd like to ask Mrs., I think it's Mrs. Pam Ward,
I believe —
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:

Yes.

MR. ECHARD: I noticed prior to the trial that
you were talking to one of the officers involved Mr. Leishman.
I'd like to have her asked if that is a very
close relationship, that might affect her determination if Mr. Leishman was a witness in the trial.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: He's a very good friend,
but of course I, you know, I know I would be fair. I
would consider the facts.
MR. ECHARD: If it came to a question about the
accuracy of the, or the validity of the testimony of
Mr. Leishman as compared to the testimony of another
individual, Your Honor, I'd like to have her asked if
that might affect her determination as a jury member.
-6-

PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:

I don't think so.

MR. ECHARD: I'd like to have Mrs. Ward asked
if in her conversations with Mr. Leishman prior to
the time she was empaneled, they discussed anything
at all concerning the case or the circumstances surrounding the case that's pending today.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD:

No.

(P.T., P. 6, L. 1, through L. 24)
All jury members were asked during the questioning by
the Court or by counsel if they had any physical disabilities
that would prevent them from fairly hearing and deciding the
case.

None of the jury members responded indicating any such

physical problems.

However, it was learned at the time that

the jury panel was polled that one of the individuals had an
apparent problem with his hearing.
Do you wish to have the jury polled?
MR. ECHARD:

Yes, Your Honor, I do.

THE COURT: The law provides that either party
may ask that the jury answer individually to the
verdict, and so I will ask you and each of you this
question: Was this and is this your verdict? Mr.
Lewis?
JUROR GLEN C. LEWIS:
question again, please?
THE COURT:

Will you state your

Was this and is this your verdict?

JUROR LEWIS: I didn't understand it.
again. I don't hear too good.

Tell me

THE COURT: Was this your verdict, and is it
now your verdict?
JUROR LEWIS:
THE COURT:
verdict?

Yes.

Yes, it's my verdict.

Mr. Lee, was this and is this your

JUROR DAN LEE: Yes, Your Honor.
(P.T., P. 11, L. 11, through P. 12, L. 2)
-7-

The only evidence presented by the State that pointed
to the Defendant's involvement consisted of the testimony of
two eyewitnesses, Barry Godwin and Gary Charles Brown.

Other

witnesses were called by the State, but none of them were
able to give any testimony other than background information
concerning the interview of the two eyewitnesses and the
arrest of the Defendant.
BARRY GODWIN
One of the eyewitnesses, Barry Godwin, within five
minutes after the robbery of the Circle K Store, described
the robber as being 51 9" in height with a short afro hair
style, in his mid to late twenties, and clean shaven.
(Transcript, Page 12, Line 7, through Line 27)

The in-

vestigating officer, Steven Leishman, asked Mr. Godwin if
the robber had any prominent hair features such as full bushy
sideburns, beard, mustache, or extraordinary eyebrows. Mr.
Godwin said that he appeared to be clean shaven.
L. 1, through L. 9)

(T., P. 13,

Mr. Godwin was shown a group of photo-

graphs by Officer Leishman and picked out Exhibit C as the
person who looked like the robber.
Barry Godwin picked out the Defendant's photograph
on June 22, 1975, one day after the robbery, but did not
see the Defendant until October 3, 1975, the date of the
preliminary hearing.

(T., P. 74, L. 20, through L. 30)

On

October 3, 1975,-Mr. Godwin saw the Defendant prior to his
testifying.

(T., P. 48, L. 10, through L. 12)

Mr. Godwin

testified under oath at the preliminary hearing that he had
told the officer at one time that the individual who robbed
-8-

him was 5' 6" and on another occasion that he was 5' 9".
(T., P. 59, L. 3, through L. 12)

Mr. Godwin testified at

the preliminary hearing that the robber did not have a goatee,
a mustache, or any sideburns.

(T., P. 63, L. 1, through L. 10)

At the trial held on November 25, 1975, Barry Godwin
for the first time described the robber as being 61 1" in
height.

(T., P. 30, L. 17, through L. 24; T., P. 59, L. 10,

through L. 15)

He also testified that the robber had a

medium afro hair style and was clean shaven.

(T., P. 38,

L. 23, through L. 28; T., P. 40, L. 4, through L. 8) Mr.
Godwin Stated that the Defendant's appearance in Court was
different than the appearance of the robber in that the
Defendant had chin whiskers, a mustache, sideburns, and his
hair was wavier.

(T., P. 52, L. 22, through L. 27)
GARY CHARLES BROWN

The other eyewitness, Gary Charles B^own, a few days
after the robbery, reported to the police that the robber
was 5' 9", had a short afro-type hair style, a smaller than
average nose, and was wearing a dark jacket with a cloth
collar.

(T., P. 104, L. 11, through L. 22)

At the preliminary hearing Mr. Brown testified that
he passed the robber as he entered the Circle K Store and
that he was 6f 1/2" tall and that the robber was 51 9" tall.
(T., P. 136, L. 17, through L. 29)

Mr. Brown also stated

that the robber had a normal black man's hair,, no long
sideburns, no mustache, and no goatee or any bther type of
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facial hair.

(T., P. 139, L. 14, through L. 28)

In des-

scribing the difference between the Defendant's appearance
on the date of the preliminary hearing and that of the robber,
Mr. Brown stated that the Defendant had hair on his lip
which the robber did not have, the Defendant's hair style
was different

than that of the robber, and the Defendant's

sideburns were different than that of the robber.

(T., P. 141,

L. 8, through P. 143, L. 2)
At the trial on November 25, 1975, Mr. Brown stated
for the first time that the robber was 6' tall, had a shadow
of a mustache, wavy
goatee.

afro-type hair cut, sideburns, and a

(T., P. 95, L. 4, through L. 7; T., P. 96, L. 21,

through L. 26; T., P. 100, L. 22, through L. 25)
Mr. Brown testified that a few days prior to his
testimony in District Court the prosecuting attorney had
placed Mr. Godwin and Mr. Brown on the stand in the District
Court and went over their testimony in the presence of each
other.

(T., P. 116, L. 18, through L. 25; T., P. 120, L. 30,

through P. 121, L. 2)

This was the first time Mr. Brown had

heard the testimony of Mr. Godwin and Mr. Brown testified
that the meeting had a durastic effect upon the testimony
he presented at trial.

(T., P. 119, L. 26, through P. 120,

L. 3)
DEFENSE TESTIMONY
The Defendant, Keith S. Brooks, testified in his own
behalf and stated that he had been with his girlfriend, Leila
-10-

Betty Gavaros, on the 21st day of June.

J&t 10:30 p.m. on

that date, he purchased food at the Stimson1s Market in Ogden
City from a Janice Hazel Sandburn who was operating a drivein window.

The Defendant also testified that he had not been

in Bountiful on that day and did not rob the Circle K Store.
(T., P. 203, L. 28, through P. 204, L. 9)

The State's wit-

nesses had testified that the robbery occurred at approximately
10:20 p.m. on the 21st day of June, 1975, in Bountiful City.
The Defendant's girlfriend, Leila Betty Gavaros,
testified that on the 21st day of June, 1975, she was with
the Defendant the entire day and that he had only been out
of her presence for approixmately 20 minutes when he went
to Stimson's Market to purchase food.

Prior to that time

the two of them had been at Pine View Dam in Weber County,
State of Utah.

(T., P. 167, L. 16, through P. 172, L. 6)

Two other witnesses called for the defense testified that
they had seen Keith S. Brooks and Leila Betty Gavaros at
Pine View Dam on the 21st day of June, 1975.

(T., P. 187,

L. 6, through L. 9; T., P. 194, L. 2, through L. 17)
A Mrs. Janice Hazel Sandburn testified that she
worked at Stimsons Market in Ogden City on t^he 21st day of
June, 197 5, and that she waited on the Defenjdant, Keith S.
Brooks, at a drive-in window at 10:30 p.m. on that date.
Mrs. Sandburn remembers Keith S. Brooks because he had his
hair in pink curlers.

(T., P. 251, L. 1, through L. 28)

Mrs. Sandburn was very definite about the time
because of circumstances involving her employment.
L. 2, through L. 16)
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(T., P. 253,

Both Leila Betty Gavaros and the Defendant's father,
Ralph Brooks, testified that on June 21, 197 5, the Defendant's
hair style was exactly the same as that shown in Plaintiff's
Exhibits G and H.

(T., P. 175, L. 4, through L. 16; T. , P.

267, L. 11, through L. 30)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DENIED A TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL
JURY AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
It is the contention of the Defendant—Appellant,
hereinafter referred to as the Defendant, that he has been
denied a trial by an impartial jury.

This allegation is

based upon the fact that the trial court refused to remove
two jury members when challenged for cause.

As set forth

in the Statement of Facts, the prospective juror, Moore,
stated that the chief eyewitness against the Defendant,
Barry Godwin, was a neighbor and a personal friend.

Mr.

Moore and Mr. Godwin were members of the same ward of the
LDS Church.

Mr. Moore stated that his acquaintanceship

with Mr. Godwin might affect his ability to be a fair and
impartial jury member and that he would like to see Mr.
Godwin receive whatever is due to him or that justice was
met.

After extensive instructions and questioning by the

Court as to whether or not Mr. Moore could decide the case
-12-

from the facts and the law as presented by the Court, Mr.
Moore voluntarily stated, "The question I, have is, you mentioned facts.

And, of course, there's other than facts that

enter into trials, and it would be difficult to say definitely if there was something that was in balance."
The Defendant contends that the te$t that needs to
be applied to determine if a juror member is impartial is
not whether he can apply the law as instructed by the Court,
but rather whether the jury member can give the same impartial consideration to the testimony of all witnesses appearing
before the Court.

Mr. Moore was right when he -indicated that

there are other than facts that enter into trials and that
it would be difficult for him to set as a jtiry member if
testimony had to be balanced.

Mr. Moore also indicated that

he would not feel comfortable if he were the Defendant in
the trial and one of the witnesses against had a friend
on the jury with the same state of mind as 1;hat held by
Mr. Moore.
The prospective juror, Pam Ward, stat|ed that she
was a "very good friend" of Steve Leishman.

Steve Leishman

was one of the chief investigating officers of the robbery
and was involved in the early stages of the investigation.
Officer Leishman took statements from the witnesses, obtained an identification of the Defendant frojm the witnesses,
and arrested the^Defendant.

The prospective juror, Ward,

stated that she and her husband visited occasionally with

-13-

Officer Leishman and his family.

In addition, Mrs. Ward

had a business relationship with the wife of Officer
Leishman at the bank at which they were employed. Mrs.
Ward also testified that she had been having a conversation
with Officer Leishman prior to the trial.

When asked if her

friendship would effect her ability to be a juror if the
accuracy of the testimony of Mr. Leishman was challenged,
Mrs. Ward testified "I don't think so."
The friendship of the prospective jurors with the
State's witnesses is of vital importance in the trial of
the Defendant since the only evidence of the Defendant's
guilt was the identification of two eyewitnesses whose testimony was highly inconsistent.

Consequently, the main issue

in the trial was whether or not the jury believed the eyewitness' testimony in spite of the inconsistencies and in
comparison with the testimony presented by the Defendant and
witnesses testifying on his behalf.

The Court could have

easily replaced the two challenged jurors since it had five
additional jurors which could have been drawn upon.
The Defendant relies upon this Court's decision in
the case of Crawford vs. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (UT 1975).
That case involved a civil trial but the reasoning used by
the Court would seem to be more compelling in a criminal
case where an unanimous decision is required.

The Court

in its unanimous, decision stated:
One doubts that a person who harbors strong
feelings concernig anyone v/ho would sue to recover money for the death of another could be a
fair and impartial juror. She should have been
-14-

excused peremptorily and one of th^ eight surplus
jurors placed in the box.
It is no excuse to say that the verdict was
unanimous and since six of the eight jurors could
find a verdict, the error was harmless. By exercising one of their peremptory challenges upon
this prospective juror, plaintiffs had only two
remaining* The juror which remained because the
plaintiffs had no challenges to remove him may have
been a hawk amid seven doves and imposed his will
upon them.
A party is entitled to exercise his three
peremptory challenges upon impartiajl prospective
jurors, and he should not be compelled to waste
one in order to accomplish that which the trial
judge should have done.
The prospective juror in the Crawfotd case ultimately
stated that she could render a verdict free of bias and prejudice.

The same conclusion was reached by the prospective

jurors, Moore and Ward, in this case.

However, it is ob-

vious that Mr. Moore had difficulty in deciding whether or
not he could be an impartial juror.

Likewise it seems

obvious that a person who had a close relationship such as
the one between Mrs. Ward and Officer Leishntian would be
affected by that relationship in determining the weight
to be given to the testimony presented by tt^e parties.
It is the contention of the Defendant that the Court's
refusal to remove Mr. Moore and Mrs. Ward upon challenge
prevented the Defendant from having four per^mptive
challenges upon impartial prospective jurors.

Consequently,

the Court's action constituted prejudicial error and a denial
of the Defendant's constitutional right to ar^ impartial jury.
After a jury verdict had been rendered^ the Defendant
requested that the jury be polled.
-15-

Judge Swai}i polling the

jury discovered that the juror, Glen C. Lewis, had diffi-*
culty with his hearing.

Judge Swan had to ask Mr. Lewis

three times if the verdict handed to the bailiff was his
verdict.
stand it.

In the process, Mr. Lewis stated, "I don't underTell me again.

I don't hear too good."

This

was the first time that the Court or the attorneys representing the parties were aware that Mr. Lewis had a hearing
problem.

If the jury member could not understand Judge Swan

without repeating his question three times, he must have
missed a substantial part of the testimony presented in a
two-day trial.
A similiar situation existed in the case of Commonwealth vs. Brown, 332 A.2d 838 (Penn. 1974).

In this case

the Court learned while it was polling the jury that one
of the jury members had a hearing problem.

In granting a

new trial, the Court stated:
The Appellant is entitled to a jury trial
arrived at by each and all of the jurors upon
the evidence introduced.
*

*

*

The presence of a juror with a physical
impairment of such magnitude as to interfere with
a juror's ability to hear and understand the presented testimony and evidence precludes a verdict
by all the jurors. Such a disability would render
the jury incompetent to serve and would deny Appellant's right to an impartial jury trial and a fair
hearing.
*

*

*

We recognize that it is quite difficult to determine the amount of prejudice suffered by the
Appellant because of the jurors hearing difficulties.
-16-

However, the records substantiates that the juror
had difficulty in hearing- He admitted inability
to hear questions and his response^ were inconclusive as to whether or not he he&rd all of the
testimony. Thus we are confronted with a situation
where in order to assure fairness and to alleviate
any possibility of prejudice caused by the deaf
juror, we just assume prejudice foi} the sake of
insured fairness.
*

*

*

The Defendant contends that the heading difficulties
of Glen C, Lewis rendered him incompetent to enter a knowledgable verdict and thereby deprived the Defendant of an
impartial jury trial and a fair hearing.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BY THE
STATE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT'S GUILT
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE DEFENDANT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN FOUND NOT GUILTY AS A MATTER OF LAW.
This Court has held that a jury verdict against a
defendant may be set aside when it appears that the evidence
was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds
fairly acting upon it must have entertained reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime.

(State vs.

Sullivan, 307 P.2d 212; State vs. Danks 350 p.2d 146)

It

is the contention of the Defendant that the evidence presented before the jury was not sufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt the Defendant's gui|lt.
The only evidence presented at the tri^il connecting
the Defendant with the robbery of the Circle ^C Store on
June 21, 1975, was the testimony of two eyewitnesses.
-17-

These

eyewitnesses picked out a photograph which is marked as
Plaintiff's Exhibit C.

That photograph was one taken of

the Defendant, Keith S. Brooks, in October of 1971 (see
date on photograph marked Exhibit C ) .

Neither of the eye-

witnesses were asked to identify the Defendant in a line-up
or saw the Defendant at any time prior to October 3, 1975.
The witnesses, therefore, did not see the individual they
identified as being the robber for approximately three ro:
and one-half months from the date of the robbery.
When the witnesses were first interviewed by the
investigating officers, both of them stated that the robber
was clean shaven and had no facial hair.

Barry Godwin

reported to the police officers that the robber was 5 1 6"
or 5' 8" tall.
5 1 9" tall.

Gary Brown testified that the robber was

Three and one-half months later at the pre-

liminary hearing, both witnesses again testified that the
robber was clean shaven, without facial hair, and that he
was from 5' 6" to 5f 9" in height.

It was not until the

trial on November 25, 1975, that either witness ever claimed
that the robber was 61 or 61 1" in height.
In fact, the Defendant is 6' tall, has bush sideburns to the bottom of his jaw, a mustache, and a goatee.
Plaintiff's Exhibits G and H show the appearance of the
Defendant when he was arrested on June 25, 1975, four days
after the robbery.

(see dates on front of exhibits)

At the trial Barry Godwin still maintained that the
robber was clean shaven and testified that the Defendant as
-18-

he appeared at the time of the trial was different than the
robber in that he had chin whiskers, a mu|stache, sideburns
and wavier

hair.

The witness, Gary Brown, testified at

the trial that the robber had a shadow of a mustache, wavy
afro-type hair, sideburns, and a goatee.

This testimony

v/as given by Gary Brown in spite of the fact that he had
testified under oath at the preliminary hdaring that the
robber had none of these features and had told the police
officer immediately after the robbery that the robber was
clean shaven.
Mr. Brown also testified at the trial that he had
gone over his testimony with the prosecuting attorney in
the presence of Mr. Godwin two days earlier and that the
meeting had a "durastic affect" upon his testimony.
It is the contention of the Defendant that his
appearance on June 21, 1975, is established beyond doubt
by Exhibits G and H, which were taken four days later.
Additional witnesses were also called to establish that
the Defendant's appearance was the same on the 21st of June
as it was on the 25th od June, 1975.

Consequently, the

conclusion is inescapable that the witnesses did not
witness the Defendant rob the Circle K Storey
The Defendant contends that the testimony of the
State's witnesses was not sufficient to provd beyond a
reasonable doubt_the Defendant's guilt.

In fact, their

testimony proves that the Defendant could not have been the
individual that robbed the Circle K Store.
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In addition to the discrepancies in the State's case,
the Defendant presented testimony from his girlfriend, Leila
Betty Gavaros, and from Janice Sandburn that he was in Ogden
City at 10:30 p.m. on June 21, 1975.

That would be approxi-

mately 10 minutes after the robbery occurred in Bountiful,
Utah.

Janice Sandburn was a white woman who had not known

the Defendant prior to June 21, 1975 and, consequently, had
no reason to be other than impartial in her testimony.
It is the position of the Defendant that the State
did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and that
the evidence was so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that
reasonable minds must have a reasonable doubt.

Consequently,

the Defendant respectfully requests the Court to reverse
the verdict of the trial court and find the Defendant not
guilty.
SUMMARY
The Defendant contends that he has been denied a
fair and impartial jury trial as provided for by the State
and Federal Constitutions.

This contention is based upon

the fact that two of the prospective witnesses were friends
of witnesses called on behalf of the State and were not
capable of giving a fair and impartial consideration to the
evidence presented before the Court.

Therefore, the Court

committed prejudicial error in failing to remove said jurors
when challenged by the defense.

In addition, one of the

jurors who did sit on the case was unable to hear sufficiently
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well enough to comprehend the testimony and its importance
thereby disproving the Defendant of a tr^al by eight impartial jury members.
The evidence presented by the State v/as not sufficient
to prove the Defendant's ^guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and,
in fact, established that the Defendant was not the individual that robbed the Circle K Store.

Therefore, the Defendant

respectfully prays for the Court to reverse the guilty verdict
and find the Defendant not guilty or in the alternative to
refer the case back to the trial Court for a new trial.

Respectfully Submitted,
PATTERSON, PHILLIPS, GRIDLEY & ECHARD

By
Robert A. Echard
Attorney for Defendant—Appellant
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